Putting the stress on conspiracy theories: Examining associations between psychological stress, anxiety, and belief in conspiracy theories by Swami, V et al.
Running head: STRESS AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
 
 
 
Putting the Stress on Conspiracy Theories: Examining Associations between Psychological 
Stress, Anxiety, and Belief in Conspiracy Theories 
 
Viren Swami1-2, Adrian Furnham3, Nina Smyth4, Laura Weis3, Alixe Lay5, & Angela Clow4 
 
1 Department of Psychology, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK 
2 Department of Psychology, HELP University College, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
3 Department of Clinical, Educational, and Health Psychology, University College London, 
London, UK 
4 Department of Psychology, University of Westminster, London, UK 
5 Department of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
Address correspondence to: Prof. Viren Swami, Department of Psychology, East Road, 
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire CB1 1PT, UK. Email: viren.swami@anglia.ac.uk.  
 
  
Stress and Conspiracy Theories  2 
 
Abstract 
Psychological stress and anxiety may be antecedents of belief in conspiracy theories, but tests 
of this hypothesis are piecemeal. Here, we examined the relationships between stress, 
anxiety, and belief in conspiracy theories in a sample of 420 U.S. adults. Participants 
completed measures of belief in conspiracy theories, perceived stress, stressful life events, 
trait and state anxiety, episodic tension, and demographic information. Regression analysis 
indicated that more stressful life events and greater perceived stress predicted belief in 
conspiracy theories once effects of social status and age were accounted for (Adj. R2 = .09). 
State and trait anxiety and episodic tension were not significant predictors. These findings 
point to stress as a possible antecedent of belief in conspiracy theories. 
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 Conspiracy theories allege that multiple actors are intentionally plotting to accomplish 
malevolent goals (Swami & Furnham, 2014). Examples include the belief that the Apollo 
moon landings were staged and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., was the result of 
an organised plot by U.S. government agencies (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 
2010). Although prima facie evidence supporting conspiracy theories is usually scant, such 
beliefs are widespread. For example, nationally representative surveys have reported that half 
of the American public endorse at least one conspiracy theory (Oliver & Wood, 2014). This 
is concerning because conspiracist ideation is associated with negative health, sociopolitical, 
and environmental consequences (for a review, see Douglas, Sutton, Jolley, & Wood, 2016).  
 To date, most research on the antecedents of conspiracist ideation have focused on 
latent psychopathology (e.g., schizotypy and maladaptive personality traits; Barron, Morgan, 
Towell, Altemeyer, & Swami, 2014; Swami, Weis, Lay, Barron, & Furnham, 2016), biased 
cognitions (e.g., errors of probabilistic reasoning; Brotherton & French, 2014), and individual 
differences in traits such as thinking styles, political cynicism, and self-esteem (e.g., 
Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; 
Swami et al., 2010, 2011; Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014). Just as 
important as these perspectives is the broader psychosocial context in which conspiracy 
theories emerge.  
 In particular, psychological stress and anxiety have been identified as factors that are 
related to belief in conspiracy theories. This perspective stems from the idea that conspiracy 
theories provide simplified, causal explanations for distressing events (Hofstadter, 1966) and 
conceptualises conspiracy theories as neutral, rational narratives of the world (Nefes, 2015). 
This perspective also suggests that conspiracy theories help to regulate levels of acute stress. 
That is, by reinstalling a sense of order, control, and predictability following a distressing 
external threat, conspiracy theories help individuals to regulate their own negative emotions, 
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restore a sense of agency, and maintain self-esteem (Robins & Post, 1997). To date, however, 
evidence of associations between stress, anxiety, and belief in conspiracy theories has been 
piecemeal.  
 In terms of anxiety, Grzesiak-Feldman (2013) reported that both state and trait anxiety 
were significantly and positively correlated with conspiracy thinking about outgroups, 
although the sample size in this study was small (N = 87). In an earlier study of high school 
students (N = 118), however, Grzesiak-Feldman (2007) reported that trait, but not state, 
anxiety was significantly correlated with conspiracist ideation, but the relationship was 
positive in boys and negative in girls. Two further studies (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013, Studies 
2-3) also found that pre-exam anxiety increased conspiracist ideation about Jewish people, 
possibly because anxiety led to greater processing of information related to threat-related out-
groups. Similarly, Radnitz and Underwood (2016) reported that an anxiety prime increased 
conspiracist beliefs following exposure to a mock news article.  
 To our knowledge, previous research has not directly assessed relationships between 
psychological stress and conspiracist ideation, although indirect evidence is supportive. For 
example, distressing experiences (e.g., a perceived lack of control, subjective uncertainty) 
heighten the tendency to perceive patterns in unrelated stimuli (Whitson & Galinky, 2008) 
and to make dispositional inferences about others (Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010), 
which promote conspiracist ideation (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). Stressful situations 
also increase the tendency to think less analytically (Starcke & Brand, 2012), which in turn 
promotes belief in conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014). These studies point to anxiety, 
and possibly stress, as antecedents of belief in conspiracy theories, but the literature remains 
equivocal and limited.  
 Here, we tested the hypothesis that greater psychological stress and anxiety are 
associated with belief in conspiracy theories. Stress, in this view, is experienced in response 
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to a range of stimuli; within manageable parameters, one’s sense of well-being can be 
maintained, but if these stimuli go beyond normal limits, they become stressors. As such we 
hypothesised that higher stress would be associated with greater endorsement of conspiracy 
theories. To operationalise stress, we used self-report measures of perceived chronic stress 
(i.e., respondents’ subjective appraisal of events as threatening or challenging in the last 
month) and the incidence of major stressful life events in the last 6 months, with the 
expectation that both variables would be positively associated with belief in conspiracy 
theories.  
 We also examined associations between belief conspiracy theories and anxiety, which 
was operationalised as state anxiety, trait anxiety, and episodic tension. There were two 
reasons for this. First, inclusion of these measures helps to provide insight into earlier 
equivocal relationships between anxiety and belief in conspiracy theories (Gzresiak-Feldman, 
2007, 2013). Second, because stress and anxiety are inherently linked (Everly, 1990), the 
concurrent inclusion of these variables allows us to distinguish between stress and anxiety as 
antecedents of belief in conspiracy theories. Additionally, because those with lower social 
status are known to report more stressful life events and anxiety (Blair, 2010), we controlled 
for subjective social status in our analyses.  
Method 
Procedures and Participants 
 The study was approved by the relevant university ethics committee. Data were 
collected via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website in September 2015. MTurk 
samples are more demographically-diverse than standard Internet samples and the site is 
accepted as a source of high-quality data for social science research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011). A brief study description, including estimated duration and compensation, 
was posted on the website and advertised to MTurk workers who achieved a > 98% approval 
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rate and completed at least 1,000 hits. We limited participation to MTurk workers from the 
U.S., because not all our measures have been validated for use outside this national context. 
After providing informed consent, participants were directed to the measures described 
below, which were presented in an anonymous form and in random order via the 
randomisation function with Qualtrics, which hosted the survey. In exchange for completing 
the survey, participants were paid $0.50. Participants with large amounts of missing data (n = 
34) were excluded from the dataset. All participants received debriefing information at the 
end of the survey. 
 The final sample consisted of 225 women and 195 men, ranging in age from 20 to 78 
years (M = 44.68, SD = 12.38). The majority of participants self-reported as White (82.6%), 
while 8.3% were of Black ancestry, 4.8% of Asian ancestry, and 4.3% as some other ethnic 
background. In terms of educational qualifications, 38.4% had completed secondary 
schooling, 5.2% were still in full-time education, 42.6% had an undergraduate degree, 13.1% 
had a postgraduate degree, and 0.7% had some other qualification.  
Measures 
 Belief in conspiracy theories. Participants completed the Belief in Conspiracy 
Theories Inventory (BCTI; Swami et al., 2010, 2011), a 15-item measure describing a range 
of conspiracy theories (sample item: “The Apollo moon landings never happened and were 
staged in a Hollywood film studio”). Participants rated their belief that each conspiracy was 
true on a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (Completely false) to 9 (Completely true). Scores were 
averaged, with higher scores reflecting greater belief in conspiracy theories. Scores on this 
measure have good factorial validity (Swami et al., 2011) and correlate strongly with scores 
from generic measure of conspiracist ideation (e.g., Brotherton et al., 2013). Here, 
Cronbach’s α for the BCTI was .92. 
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 Perceived stress. We used the 10-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, 
Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983), which measures an individual’s subjective appraisal of the 
degree to which situations in her or his life are stressful (sample item: “In the last month, how 
often have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your life?”). Items 
were designed to tap how unpredictable, uncontrollable, and overloaded respondents find 
their lives. All items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (Never) to 4 (Very often) 
and, following reverse-coding of 4 items, an overall score was computed as the mean of all 
items (higher scores reflect greater perceived stress). The PSS has very good psychometric 
properties in diverse populations (Lee, 2012). Here, Cronbach’s α for the PSS was .90.  
 Major stressful life events. The List of Threatening Experiences Questionnaire 
(LTE-Q; Brugha, Bebbington, Tennant, & Hurry, 1985) was used to assess the incidence of 
stressful life events. The scale consists of 12 items, with dichotomous responses (0 = No, 1 = 
Yes), about the occurrence of 12 prevalent major stressful events that may have occurred in 
the preceding 6 months (sample item: “Serious illness, injury, or assault to your person”). A 
global score was computed as the sum of all affirmative responses, with higher scores 
reflecting the occurrence of more stressful life events. Global scores on the LTE-Q have been 
shown to have good psychometric properties (Brugha & Cragg, 1990). Here, Cronbach’s α 
for this scale was .70. 
 State anxiety. We used Form Y-1 of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) to measure state anxiety (sample 
item: “I feel strained”). This 20-item measure reflects a feeling of anxiety at the present 
moment and is a temporary emotional state (Spielberger & Reheiser, 2004). All items were 
rated on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Very much so). Ten items were 
reverse-coded prior to analyses and an overall score was computed as the mean of all items, 
with higher scores reflecting greater state anxiety. Test-retest reliabilities are low, as would 
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be expected for a transitory emotional state, but internal consistency coefficients are 
acceptable (Spielberger et al., 1983). Here, Cronbach’s α for this scale was .73.  
 Trait anxiety. To measure trait anxiety, we used Form Y-2 of the STAI (Spielberger 
et al., 1983), which measures a differential trait reflective of a tendency to worry (Spielberger 
& Reheiser, 2004; sample item: “I feel nervous and restless”). The scale consists of 20 items 
that are rated on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 4 (Almost always). Nine 
items were reverse-coded prior to analyses and an overall score was computed as the mean of 
all items. Higher scores on this scale reflect greater trait anxiety. This form of the STAI has 
been shown to have good psychometric properties (Spielberger et al., 1983). Here, 
Cronbach’s α for this scale was .84.  
 Episodic tension. To measure episodic tension, we used the Tension-Anxiety 
subscale of the Short Form of the Profile of Mood States (POMS-SF; Shacham, 1983). This 
subscale consists of 6 adjectives (sample item: “Tense”), which participants are asked to rate 
for the degree to which each adjective described themselves during the past week. As such, it 
provides a measure of transient or episodic tension. All items were rated on a 5-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). A subscale score was computed as the mean of 
all 6 items, with higher scores reflective of greater tension and anxiety. The POM-SF, 
including its subscales, has good psychometric properties (Baker, Denniston, Zabora, 
Polland, & Dudley, 2002). Here, Cronbach’s α for the Tension-Anxiety subscale was .89.  
 Socioeconomic status. We used the MacArthur Ladder of Subjective Social Status 
(MLSSS; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000) to measure respondents’ subjective 
social status. Participants were presented with a “social ladder” and asked to indicate the rung 
they felt best represented their socioeconomic status. Adler et al. (2000) reported that 
responses on the MLSSS are strongly correlated with traditional measures of socioeconomic 
status.  
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 Demographics. Participants were asked to provide their demographic details, 
consisting of sex, age, ethnicity, and educational qualifications. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 An independent-samples t-test showed that women (M = 2.88, SD = 1.41) and men (M 
= 2.62, SD = 1.35) did not significantly differ in the belief in conspiracy theories, t(418) = 
1.93, p = .054, d = 0.17. Analyses of variance showed that there were significant differences 
in belief in conspiracy theories between ethnic groups, F(3, 416) = 5.40, p = .001, ηp2 = .02, 
and between educational groups, F(4, 416) = 2.87, p = .015, ηp2 = .02. Younger participants 
were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, r = -.15, p = .002, but there was no 
significant correlation between belief in conspiracy theories and subjective social status, r = -
.06, p = .247. Although these analyses suggest some demographic differences in belief in 
conspiracy theories, effect sizes were negligible-to-small. For this reason, we pooled the data 
for all subsequent analyses, but controlled for age and subjective social status. 
Regression Analysis 
 Partial correlations (controlling for social status and age) between belief in conspiracy 
theories and our measures of stress and anxiety are reported in Table 1. As seen, stronger 
belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with more stressful life events in the 
last 6 months, greater perceived stress in the last month, and higher trait anxiety. Effect sizes 
were small-to-moderate (rs = .10-.29). We next conducted a hierarchical linear regression 
with subjective social status and age entered in a first step1 and the stress and anxiety 
measures entered in a second step. The first step of the regression with subjective social 
status and age was significant, F(2, 417) = 5.30, p = .005, Adj. R2 = .02, with only age 
emerging as a significant predictor, B = -.02, SE = .01, ß = -.05, t = -0.96, p = .002. The 
second step of the regression was also significant, F(7, 412) = 7.88, p < .001, Adj. ΔR2 = .09. 
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Of the variables entered into the model, the only significant predictors were stressful life 
events, B = .22, SE = .04, ß = .28, t = 5.61, p < .001, age, B = -.02, SE = .01, ß = -.13, t = -
2.77, p = .006, and perceived stress, B = .26, SE = .12, ß = .12, t = 2.21, p = .028. 
Multicollinearity was not a limiting factor in this analysis (all variance inflation factors < 
2.52).  
Discussion 
 Here, we examined associations between stress, anxiety, and belief in conspiracy 
theories. Our findings suggested that two separate indices of psychological stress were 
positively associated with belief in conspiracy theories once the effects of subjective social 
status and respondent age had been accounted for. Conversely, indices of anxiety were not 
significantly associated with belief in conspiracy theories once all other effects had been 
taken into account. Broadly speaking, our findings are consistent with theoretical discussions 
of the role that conspiracy theories play, particularly in terms of providing rational narratives 
of the world (Nefes, 2015). Below, we provide a fuller account of stress as a possible 
antecedent of belief in conspiracy theories.  
 Major world events, particularly those that are traumatic and emotive, are known to 
increase levels of stress (e.g., Goenjian et al., 2000). In addition to being stressful, such 
events also increase feelings of uncertainty, confusion, and existential threat (van Prooijen & 
Jostmann, 2013). In such a climate, some individuals may engage in sense-making processes 
aimed at restoring individual agency and a belief that the world is orderly and predictable 
(van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). In this view, some individuals may seek out and assimilate the 
sorts of all-encompassing explanations for events that conspiracy theories provide. By 
simplifying and by linking a series of events in relation to its supposed causes and effects, 
conspiracy theories may offer seemingly coherent explanations for distressing phenomena. 
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 Of course, this view suggests that stressful events give rise to sense-making processes 
that favour conspiracy theories, whereas our data suggest that intra-individual subjective 
experiences of stress and the experience of negative life events are related to belief in 
conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, there may be parallels between the two pathways. For 
example, an individual experiencing stressful life events may begin to engage in cognitive 
patterns (e.g., seeing patterns in unrelated stimuli, making dispositional inferences about 
others; Sullivan et al., 2008; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) that promote conspiracist ideation. 
Thus, stressful intra-individual life events may sometimes lead to a tendency to adopt a 
conspiracist mind-set. Once this worldview has become entrenched, other conspiratorial ideas 
are more easily assimilated and reinforced (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012).  
 Alternatively, it is not stress that is driving our findings, but rather threats to a sense 
of control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). That is, in the aftermath of repeated distressing 
events, it is possible that some individuals may seek out conspiracist explanations that 
reinstall a sense of order or control, which in turn restore a sense of agency (Robins & Post, 
1997). Another possibility is that individuals who more strongly endorsed the stress or 
stressful life event measures may feel more disaffected, alienated from society, or victims of 
structural power. These individuals may also potentially reject civic structure that are meant 
(but have failed) to prevent such harm, which in turn makes them more receptive to 
conspiracy theories. One way of pushing this research forward might be to examine complex 
mediatonal relationships between stress, alienation, perceptions of control, and belief in 
conspiracy theories.  
While our results are supportive of the stress-conspiracy theories link, our findings in 
relation to anxiety present a mixed picture. Trait anxiety was significantly correlated with 
belief in conspiracy theories, but did not emerge as a significant predictor in our regression 
analysis once the effects of stress had been account for. This weaker effect of anxiety was 
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possibly obtained because anxiety is largely reactive in nature (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970). According to this view, highly anxious individuals react more strongly to 
stressful events, but in the absence of stress they tend to be no more anxious than those low in 
anxiety. In other words, it is the experience of stress per se that may be the influencing factor 
vis-à-vis whether or not individuals begin to adopt a conspiracist worldview. Another 
possibility is that anxiety only becomes problematic when it reaches maladaptive levels: one 
previous study reported a significant association between maladaptive anxiety and belief in 
conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2016).  
A number of issues limit the present findings. Given our recruitment method, our 
sample should not be considered representative of the wider U.S. population. There is 
evidence that MTurk workers have distinct personality profiles compared with offline 
samples (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013), which limits the generalisability of our 
findings. It is also notable that perceived stress and stressful life events only accounted for 
9% of the variance in belief in conspiracy theories. Although this is comparable to other 
studies (e.g., thinking styles account for 8% of the variance in belief in conspiracy theories; 
Swami et al., 2014), it does point to neglected variables that could contribute to a fuller 
picture of the antecedents of conspiracist ideation. Additionally, our data are cross-sectional 
and the direction of causation should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. For example, it is 
possible that assimilating a conspiracy theory increases cognitive load or negative affect, 
which in turn increases stress and anxiety. Future work would do well to more carefully 
unpack direction of causation in future work.  
There are a number of other ways in which our findings could be developed further. It 
would be useful to examine the impact of acute stress on belief in conspiracy theories, 
something we did not measure in the present work. One way of achieving this would be to 
compare belief in conspiracy theories before and after participants take part in an acute stress 
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induction paradigm (e.g., Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). In addition, it would be 
useful to examine fine-grain associations between belief in conspiracy theories and 
neurophysiological responses to stress. For instance, there is evidence that hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis functioning is associated with greater internalised racism (Tull, 
Sheu, Butler, & Cornelious, 2005) and that elevated cortisol response is associated with self-
reported prejudice (Bijleveld, Sheepers, & Ellemers, 2012). It would be useful to extend these 
findings to examine associations with belief in conspiracy theories. 
The above limitations notwithstanding, our findings may be useful for policy-makers 
seeking to reduce belief in conspiracy theories that are associated with negative behavioural 
outcomes (Douglas et al., 2016). For example, it may be possible to indirectly reduce belief 
in conspiracy theories through stress reduction techniques. Before such interventions can be 
developed, however, further research is necessary to examine the associations between stress 
and conspiracist ideation more fully. The present findings shed light on a hitherto neglected 
aspect of such beliefs and it is our hope that this preliminary study stimulates further research 
in this area. Given the range of negative consequences of belief in conspiracy theories 
(Douglas et al., 2016), this remains an urgent issue for scholars and policy-makers.  
Footnotes 
1 We also repeated this analysis, including ethnicity and education in the first step of the 
regression with age and subjective social status. Neither of the former variables reached 
significance, either in the first or second steps of the regression. Stressful life events, age, and 
perceived stress remained the only significant predictors in the second step. 
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Table 1. Partial Correlations between Belief in Conspiracy Theories, Stress, and Anxiety, 
Controlling for Subjective Social Status and Age. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Belief in conspiracy 
theories 
- .15* .29** .06 .10* .07 
(2) Perceived stress   .25** .41** .22** .43** 
(3) Stressful life events    .29** .22** .30** 
(4) State anxiety     .44** .74** 
(5) Trait anxiety      .39** 
(6) Episodic tension      - 
 
Note. N = 420; * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
